themselves castigated by a future generation of Laskys for having had no permanently true ideas. The alternative, doing nothing while waiting for absolute truth to arrive on our doorstep, is not worth thinking about.
What we can do is to do our best in an endless struggle with questions of value and judgment. After all, most of us know, in barely creditable philosophical terms perhaps, what we want in the world. We want peace, fairness, equality, and so on. What remains in dispute is the method of realizing those simple ideals. If Lasky would have us all shut up until one of us comes up with the solution, then he would have us give up on history. And so would Johnson if he would have us all be beyond moral reproach before we ventured an idea in an active and changing world. I for one cannot envisage that. It is better to struggle with error, in error, producing error and so making oneself publicly available for instruction, within history, than to make a gesture that in itself (by giving up on active thinking) is an open invitation to totalitarianism.
Perhaps the day of the heroic intellectual is gone. Heroes all tend to be 'he.' Perhaps the day of the new intellectual is at hand. If so, she will be found working in an intelligent political shaping of universities, community organizations, feminist movements, local political groups of a variety of kinds. This work may lack some of the public fanfare of the old masculine hero of the mind. But we can easily forego that. We cannot forego the game of living by our wits. We need to be ready to welcome the advent of a new kind of organic intellectual, without expecting too many heroics.
CHARLES LOCK Scapegoating Intellectuals
'Is there a gulf between the educated, non-academic public and the university intellectuals ... ?'
What university intellectuals? 'Commitment to a profession' is a cover for careerism and has little to do with being an intellectual. The assumption that intellectuals find their natural habitat in universities hardly stands examination, in North America or Europe. The assumption is presumably extrapolated from fractional instances -the odd Cambridge college for a couple of decades, the New School for Social Research or Chicago's Committee on Social Thought episodically. There is and ought to be no institutional preserve for intellectuals: if there were, intellectuals would constitute a professional class much like any other. When it happens, infrequently, that intellectuals are perceived to form a group, that perception may be due to academic affiliation. There is no likely place to find intellectuals, any more than there is a likely place to UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO QUARTERLY, VOLUME 58, NUMBER 4, SUMMER 1989 meet strangers. Wittgenstein thought that no honest, thoughtful person could be a professor. I have encountered intellectuals in the most unlikely places, including universities.
The nostalgic terms of the question -'gulf ... widening ... decline' -are themselves disturbing. Cultural pessimism is politically suspect (more than suspect, by now) and especially so when we look back to celebrate a degree of criticism and disaffection within society. Are we not in danger of lamenting that there is less now to complain about than there was in the 1950S? McCarthyism made intellectuals look and feel important, for that kind of 'tame persecution' (by this century's standards) is a most gratifying form of flattery.
The institutional conservatism of the 1950s, in both governments and universities, provided the frame and the tension within which radical and liberal critics worked: attached but not confined to academic life, contributing to journals independent of institutional support and control. Those journals -notably Partisan Review -were read by academics as well as by the educated public, and their influence was widespread. That influence has been most concentrated and enduring in the universities; and perhaps only within departments and colleges of the liberal arts has a note of progressive consensus been held. Here, if nowhere else in society (we may hypothesize with glum satisfaction), 'liberal' is not a dirty word.
For the rest of society liberal thinking is not dangerous, even as a threat, for it is entirely outmoded. And it may be precisely because liberal arts institutions have established themselves as bastions of the progressive (exerting considerable influence over the tone of institutionally supported journals and activities) that the exciting and politically determined intellectual debates of our day are to be found outside academic life. Here there is discourse that bridges, as effectively as any in the 1950S and 1960s, the' gulf' between intellectuals with some form of academic affiliation and the educated public. One could, however reluctantly, consider the place of Roger Scruton and the Salisbury Review in Britain, of Alain Finkielkraut, Bernard-Henri Levy, and 'Ie nouveau droit' in France, and in the United States of an array of right-wing journals of impressive intellectual credentials; among their contributors are former radicals and liberals such as Norman Podhoretz and Irving Kristol. The tone of UTQ's question suggests that we should prefer to lament their passing -but that we must anyway lament their staying.
There is a strong temptation for academics in the liberal arts to overlook the sheer vitality of right-wing thinking because of a residual assumption that 'intellectual' is an attribute of, even in the preserve of, the Left. Intellectuals are no more bound by ideology than by institution. In Britain it hardly matters that the aging figures of the 'New Left,' Christopher Hill, E.P. Thompson, and Richard Hoggart, are still active and publishing; the death of Raymond Williams was not felt to be of great or immediate consequence. The New Left is still an entity, a formation, but one that is now marginalized and passe. (It is particularly regrettable that such a powerful, ranging thinker as Perry Anderson should be marginalized also.) In Britain wistful laments for the liberals of the 1950S and the Left of the 1960s (New and Old -remember John Berger?) would have us assume that there is now no intellectual group or force. But at the same time we are told -boastfully by the Right, counter-conspiratorially by the Left -that the Salisbury Review is the most influential of serious journals. I have never seen a copy, nor have many of my academic colleagues, even in Britain. The Salisbury Review is available only by subscription, and I suspect that those who subscribe -lawyers, civil servants, teachers, financiers -represent the educated, non-academic public just as comprehensively as did those who once read Encounter, or, in the us, Partisan Review. This is the place to answer, briefly, the third question: 'Is there a nostalgia for public intellectuals ... ?' In restricted circles, mainly academic, yes, and there is a strong likelihood, given the terms of its framing, that this symposium will be merely symptomatic. The very desire to perpetuate one particular model of intellectual discourse may even have contributed to the intellectual triumph of the Right. The exercise of wistful nostalgia is, after all, reactionary. Canada has politicians labelled 'Progressive Conservatives': to lament the passing of radicalism is to be a progressive reactionary.
'Who today are the intellectuals who help to shape the public's thinking as did ... ?' This question assumes a phenomenon (that intellectuals once did 'shape ... thinking') and then stabilizes it as a prescription. If intellectuals have a set task, defined by others according to ideology and institution, then their ontological status is in question. What remains is a role, a function, sheer instrumentality.
The Editorial Board of UTQ has contrived to steer us around the question whose answer is presupposed by all the others: 'What is an intellectual?' An intellectual is, perhaps, anyone who understands why that question must be avoided. It can be answered only in terms of examples, of members who constitute what is perceived by others to be a class. An intellectual is anyone who is perceived to be one. Here is a possible answer: 'Some body who is, or approximates to the condition of, Ludwig Wittgenstein or Walter Benjamin.' Which being interpreted is: 'The name of a body that once contained a mind that thought intensely, said body now being a corpse.' These two names are not lightly selected; the selection is meant to demonstrate the unqualified irrelevance of esteem and prestige during an intellectual's lifetime and, presumably, in the case of the mute inglorious ones, for ever after.
The recognition of an intellectual, by others, is always belated. Genius, maverick, gadfly, charlatan, crazy, inaccurate, dangerous, unscholarly, irrelevant, irresponsible, unprofessional: such are the labels affixed to those we now call 'intellectuals' during the years of their greatest originality and daring -if they were ever the object of public discussion. To be called an 'intellectual' is to be domesticated by social fiat, is to be almost dead. We may be puzzled, bemused, irritated, exasperated by some body, let us say Derrida's, and one day our eyes will open, the scales will fall, and we will declare with all the smug self-satisfaction of an act of categorical recognition: 'But he's an intellectual!'
In the mid-1970S Le Monde polled its readers on those whom they considered to be the top ten intellectuals in France. Sartre and Aron came out top, and I don't recall such relatively youthful irritants as Barthes, Girard, Foucault, Derrida, or Ricoeur figuring on the list at all. The Times shortly thereafter (the insular instinct) conducted a similar poll and made the sobering discovery that eight out of ten of those perceived to be Britain's top intellectuals were British only by courtesy of Hitler: Popper, Gombrich, Koestler, Canetti, Hayek ... Monuments, clearly, of aging intellect.
Such polls, and this symposium, would provide harmless entertainment if the mood was not always retrospective (all the great ones are past their prime) and prescriptive (vacant shoes). Cultural pessimism and its attendant evils are stirred by our wistfulness: the great intellectuals, those who honour the age, those of whom we are proud to be contemporaries, our guiding spirits, are (always already) almost dead.
I might have stopped there: cool reproach, smart evasion. But something's amiss: I know far more than I ought about this matter that I affect to disdain. My memory of those polls betrays my concern. The question that is now insistent is: 'What is the fascination of identifying intellectuals? Why do we need assurance of the presence of intellectuals among us?' Do we seek an alibi? Are we trying to use the notion or class of 'intellectuals' as an excuse for our own careerism and cerebral indulgence? Is it coincidental that academic specialization increased drastically in an era of 'conspicuous intellectuals'? Do we, when we designate some as 'intellectuals,' thereby implicitly excuse everyone else from the responsibility of thinking? Is it the 'scapegoating' of intellectuals -the domestication of otherness by society's labelling -that actually licenses specialization, that permits us in good conscience to cultivate our respective patches?
It may be, then, that 'intellectuals' are not those who think but those who do our thinking for us. 'There is no alibi for existence,' says Bakhtin. None for thinking, either. Specialization, professionalism, expertise: these virtues of the technocratic society seduce us with their plausible alibis. The most insidious distinction -the one on which society rests, by which it functions smoothly and efficiently -is that between thinking and living. I hesitate to define, but this is sure: of any such distinction intellectuals are (precariously, or extravagantly) unaware.
